Bonaparte Sets Out
Part 1
Part 2
Since early in 1797 Bonaparte had had all these matters in mind. He had discussed them with Desaix,
whom he was already beginning to single out as one of the ablest of the revolutionary generals. He had
pressed the idea in his correspondence with Talleyrand in Paris. And in making peace with Austria in Italy he had
taken good care
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to get possession not only of the
Venetian fleet but also of the Ionian Islands at the mouth
of the Adriatic. Admiral Brueys, with a French squadron, was already at Corfu, and it simply remained now to
seize Malta as well. With Malta in French hands the Mediterranean would be well on the way to becoming a French lake.
While he was still in Italy Bonaparte sent an agent to spy on the island, and this man had returned
with the very good news that the Knights of St John were quite unable to defend the place. The fervour which had once
taken them on crusades to Jerusalem had long since gone, and now in Malta, their last refuge, they had sunk into the
futile daze that overtakes an aimless garrison life. The French knights in particular would never resist an invasion.
Malta, Corfu and now Egypt: the way lay open to the French and the strategy practically
declared itself upon the map.
There were visions of glory in all this, dreams of Alexandrian conquests in the fabulous East, but even the most
superficial study of Bonaparte's actions at this time shows that he was very far from being carried away by his own
enthusiasm. He was very cool and very practical. He was not a Hitler making impassioned speeches; he was a newly-arrived
young general of incredible confidence, quietly and precisely imposing his will upon the men who held the power in Paris.
He had conquered Italy, not to enjoy a popular success, but to prepare himself for the next
jump forward.
'Now at the age of 28 he was very well aware that he was the idol of all France; indeed, this was made evident to him
every day in Paris. The street where he had bought his little house had been renamed Rue de la Victoire, and he could
not emerge from it without exuberant crowds pressing round him. He had but to enter a theatre for the audience to rise and applaud. But no man ever had fewer delusions about himself than Bonaparte. When his secretary, Bourrienne, remarked
upon his popularity one day he replied, `Bah, the crowd would flock to see me just as eagerly if I were going to
the scaffold.' It was true, of course.
It was also true that he could not continue for long as the national hero unless
he consolidated his reputation with new victories. The important thing at this stage, however, is that Napoleon Bonaparte saw all
this very clearly - just as clearly as he saw that the Directory feared him and therefore hated him and wanted to get
rid of him. He on his side despised the Directors: `Do you imagine,' he asked Miot, `that I triumph in Italy in order
to aggran-dize a pack of lawyers who form the Directory, and men like Carnot and Barras? What an idea!' - but he was also
aware that the time to strike had not quite arrived as yet.
And so he affects to fall in with the government's plans. He accepts the command of the expedition to invade England,
he even makes a tour of the Channel ports, detaches privateers to reconnoitre the English coast between Rye and Folkestone,
and places orders for cannon of an English type that can be loaded with captured ammunition once the French army is ashore.
One cannot say that Bonaparte was absolutely opposed to the direct invasion of England, but it was obvious from the
first that he did not like it, and he cannot have been too displeased when Brueys reported from the Mediterranean that
his ships were not ready and could not join the rest of the French fleet at Brest.
It was also significant that although
the hatred of England in France was very great at this time (the early spring of 1798), a government appeal for a loan of
eighty million francs to finance the expedition failed miserably. Now was the moment to manoeuvre the attention of the
Directory away from the English Channel and back to the Mediterranean. Bonaparte declared his plan: `To go to Egypt,
to establish myself there and found a French colony, will require some months. But as soon as I have made England tremble
for the safety of India, I shall return to Paris, and give the enemy its death-blow. There is nothing to fear in
the interval.
Europe is calm. Austria cannot move, England is occupied with preparing her defence against invasion,
and Turkey will welcome the expulsion of the Mamelukes.' Elsewhere he said that if he sailed in May he thought he might
be back in October, but he was by no means certain about this.
When Josephine later asked him when he would return, he is
said to have answered: `Six months, six years, perhaps never.' But this reply may perhaps have been induced by the
momentary despondence of parting from her; on all occasions, now and later, Bonaparte had his eye firmly placed upon
France. To the Directory, however, the time element hardly mattered; long or short, the main thing was to get him out of
the way, and so by March 1798 we find them coming around to the Egyptian plan.
Part 1
Extract from “The Blue Nile”, Written by Alan Moorehead. Westerham Press Ltd Kent, London: 1972.
Q. What were the subsequent stages of the French Revolution until 1795?
A. The Terror lasted for ten months after September 1793. It was primarily a mobilization for war, involving the requisition of materials and labour on an unprecedented scale, and the creation of a million-strong army – albeit a poorly supplied and sometime ill-equipped one. The coercion of the rural population in particular, who saw almost all their food supplies taken for urban rations, required the other aspect of the Terror: its regimentation of political loyalties by force, and the suppression of dissent with the threat of internment and execution. Some 300,000 ‘suspects’ were locked up, and 17,000 were executed by Revolutionary Tribunals. Tens of thousands more died in the civil wars that continued to rage, and the Vendée saw wholesale massacres, with possibly over 200,000 deaths from the fighting, mass executions, and unchecked epidemic diseases that ravaged the war zone.
The politics of the Terror continued to harp on treachery and betrayal. The leading Girondins were executed after a show trial in October 1793, two weeks after Marie-Antoinette had endured a rain of slanders at her own trial, including charges of incest against her own son. But with enemies like these out of the way, continued insecurity and fear that the war was not going as it should led to repeated quests for new scapegoats. By the spring of 1794, the ‘incorruptible’ leader Maximilian Robespierre had orchestrated the trial and execution of ‘factions’ surrounding the sans-culottes leader, Hébert, and the more moderate republican hero, Danton. Hébert’s followers were guilty of wanting to purge the Convention again, and
Danton’s of wanting to relax the Terror. Both courses of action were painted as counter-revolutionary plots, in an increasingly paranoid political culture.
The Terror accelerated in the early summer of 1794, as even the vestiges of a fair trial for suspects were removed, and far-fetched accusations of conspiracy saw prisoners guillotined in batches. By late July, Robespierre’s attention had turned to the Convention again, with new accusations of hidden counter-revolution. Now, the majority realized that only an end to the Terror could ensure their own survival, and Robespierre was hounded from office on 27 July 1794 with trumped-up charges of dictatorial ambition. He and his supporters were executed without trial the next day.
With Robespierre’s death, politics became more liberal – but this also meant that the sans-culottes urban activists, who were now branded as ‘Terrorists’, were themselves persecuted. This tended now to mean imprisonment rather than execution, although in southern France a culture of vendetta would see hundreds murdered over the coming years. French armies were now more successful – one reason why Robespierre’s Terror had come to seem unnecessary – and over the following year the Convention was able to complete a new Constitution that envisaged a stable liberal system – an executive Directory of five men in place of the king, and a two-chamber legislature to prevent the dictatorship of a faction. Unfortunately, as the following years would show, the Terror had branded faction too deeply into the French psyche. Unrepentant radicals fought bitterly with open counter-revolutionaries and royalists, with the government reduced after 1797 to a series of coups against its own electorate to prevent a relapse into civil war. By the end of 1799, the military authority of General Napoleon Bonaparte, installed as First Consul by yet another coup, seemed the only way out.
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